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Summary findings
Trade, aid, and investment  are more inextricably  savings  rates  by reducing  public  sector dissavings,  th2
linked in Sub-Saharan  Africa  than anywhere  else in the  financial  losses  of public  enterprises,  and other non
world, coritends  H-sain, whose  survey  of Sub-Saharan  productive  spending.  Certain low-middle-income
Africa's  prospects  for tradv, aid, and investment  lead  African  countries  can attract a significant  amount of
to the following  broad conclusions:  foreign  direct investment,  but most resource-poor
* Developing  an outward orientation,  improving  countries  - especially  in the Sahel  and the Horn of
competitiveness,  and recapturing  its lost share in world  Africa  - will continue  to depend on foreign  aid.
markets  offers  a higher potential  payoff  than any other  * There must be a more  durable solution  to Africa's
strategy  for growth and sustainable  development  in  debt problem.  Only half of che  debt service  due can be
Sub-Saharan  countries.  If the region had maintained  paid, suggesting  the urgent need to rcduce the debt
internal competitiveness  and retained its 1970 share of  s.ock and thus debt servicing  obligations,  in alignment
world exports, successfully  defending  against  "new"  with debt servicing  capacity.  Many currenr  proposals
entrants, its 199n level of exports woulc have been  at  under discussion,  if implemented,  can bring
least $50 billion  higher than actual earnings  - considerable  relief.
assuming  that the composition  of Sub-Saharan  exports  *  Several  Sub-Saharan  countries  can attract
would have  changed  to refiect  changes  in world trade.  significant  investment  because  of their location, low
If the region  continued to rely on exports of  labor  costs,  natural resource  endowments,  and the size
commodity  products alone,  the relative  gains  would  of their domestic  market. But productive  investment
have  been much smaller.  levels  in most African  countries  have  remained
i  In the last decade, Sub-Saharan  Africa  has become  depress d, and even  where economic  policy  reform has
increasingly  dependent on external resource  flows for  been i nplemented,  the investor  response  - both
investment,  imports,  and development.  But  there is  domestic  and foreign  - has been  poor. Uncertainty,
little  chance  of sustained  high levels  of aid because  of  fears of policy  reversals,  lack of credibility  and
budget constraints  in the OECD  countries,  competing  continuity,  the contagion  effect,  and more attractive
demands  from new claimants,  and the new  opportunities  elsewhere  reinforce  such structural
conditionalities  imposed  by bilateral  donors (for  weaknesses  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  as poor
democratization,  reduced  military  spending,  ani  infrastructure,  inefficient  services,  and a weak human
improved  human rights).  Most African  countries  must  resource  base  to deprive  Africa  of new investment.
mobilize  domestic  resources  and increase  domestic
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Introduction
Sub-Saharan  Africa (SSA) has experienced  almost a decade of falling per capita
incomes. Thirteen African countries, comprising  a third of the region's population, are
actually poore&r  in per capita terms today than they were at independence. Poverty has
grown and the natural environment  has deteriorated. The region has lost a substantial
part of its share in the world market for its exports. Most countries have had balance  of
payments difficulties and have suf.ered a loss of foreign exchange and the ability to
import the goods necessary  for growth and development. Some African countries have
surrendered many of the gains made earlier in human resource development. And in
many countries open urban unemployment is a growing problem posing a threat to
stability.
In Africa, more  than other developing  regions, trade, aid, debt  and investment  are
inextricably  linked.  African countries are especially  dependent  on exports growth as it
generates the scare foreign exchange needed to import the goods and services required
for growth and development. Rising exports lead to rising imports.  And, given their
importance  in the production structure of most African economies, the level of imports
(other factors remaining  constant)  has a direct bearing on national income. Foreign aiC
flows can supplement  export-earned  foreign exchange and enable recipient countries to
enhance their impcrt capacity and achieve a  higher rate of  per  capita income and
consumption  growth than would  otherwise  be possible. In a dynamic  multi-period  setting
this would  doub!e or triple per capita incomes  faster than  if only domestic  resources were
relied upon.  New borrowings at concessional terms can also reinforce this effect
1/  Paper presented at the Royal African Society Conference on "Africa '93: Governanice,  Business
Aid'  at Oxford, March 21-23, 1993.  The author is grateful to Kazi Matin for useful comments.
2/  The author is Chief Economist, Africa Region of the World Bank.  The views expressed in this
paper are the author's and should not be attributed to the World Bank. its Management or the
Board of Directors.-2-
provided the debt servicing  payments  on the existing s.ock of debt are lower than the new
debt flows.  Unfortunately,  the severity of the debt problem in more than half of SSA
countries has limited this option.  Finally, foreign private investment, an increasingly
important source of capital flows to developinig  countries, has several added advantages
for Africa.
This paper attempts  to bring together these three elements  of the external sector -
--  trad&, aid  and  investment  --  and  assess  their  effects  on  growth  and  sustainable
development in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The first section focuses on trade.  It examines
trends in export performance  and imports  and evaluates  some of the main hypotheses  that
are advanced to explain Africa's relatively weak performance in foreign trade.  The
second section focuses on external aid, and raises a few issues about the sustainability
and effectiveness  of development  assistance. The final section explores determinants  of
private investmnent  in Africa and asks the question: What needs to be done to attract
domestic and foreign investment?- 3 -
TRADE
The notion  that African  countries  should  follow  an outward-oriented  trade strategy
for growth and development  is yet to find wide acceptance  either among intellectuals  or
policy makers in  Sub-Saharan Africa or  elsewhere.  Several disparate strands of
arguments  against  trade liberalization  are found  in the literature  and in policy  discussions.
They can be summarized  as follows:
(a)  Efficiency gains from reforms are small as domestic producers cannot
quickly reallocate resources to efficient sectors due to weaknesses  in the
human resource base,in infrastructure  and in institutions;
(b)  Even if producers  can reallocate  resources  quickly  into traditional  primary
exports, export revenues may not rise.  Africa's primary eypoiLs  face an
inelastic  world demand.  Simultaneous  expansion  of these exports by Sub-
Saharan  African countries  will depress  rather  than enhance export
revenues (this has been called the fallacy  of composition  argument);
(c)  Similarly,  if  African  countries succeed  in  reallocating revenues to
manufactured  and other non-traditional  agricultural  commodities,  growing
protectionism in the OECD countries will prevent rapid expansion of
African manufactured  exports;
(d)  Liberalization  of imports undermines  economic  growth by:
- crowding out imports of  raw materials and capital goods in favor of
consumer and luxurv goods;
- widening  trade deficits and undermining  macroeconomic  stability; and
- de-industrializing  African countries, as  domestic manufactures cannot
compete with cheaper and dumped goods from other parts of the world.
These objections  to trade liberalization  in SSA l .We  been intensely  debated  for the
nast  several  years.  Their  conclusive testing  is  beset  with  difficult  conceptual,
.aethodological  and data availability  problems. Nonetheless,  recent studies have utilized
improved analytical methods, measurement techniques  and data to test the validity of
these arguments. Although these studies may not provide definite answers to settle the
controversy, they enhance our understanding  sufficiently  to cast doubt on objections  to
trade liberalization  in Africa.  What is the empirical evidence from these studies?-4-
Export Performance
During the  1960s, the volume of exports from African countries grew at an
annual average rate of 6% a year (Table I).  Almost all countries in the region shared
in this growth. Since 1973, however,  export volumes  have remained  stagnant  or declined
significantly. For SSA, as a whole, including  oil exporters, the total volume of exports
declined on average, by about 0.7 percent a year in the 1980s. In contrast, developing
countries as a group increased their export volume in the same period by 4.6 percent
annually.
The share of African exports in world trade fell from 2.5 percent in 1970 to 1.0
percent in  1990 (Table II). More dramatic was the relative decline of African exports
among developing  countries. Africa's share of developing  country exports fell from 13
percent to 5 percent while other regions either maintained or increased their relative
shares. Africa's share of non-oil  primary commodities  also declined substantially,  from
7% to 3%.  If SSA countries had maintained  their 1970  market share of non-oil  primary
exports from LDCs and prices had remained  the same, their export earnings would have
been $20 billion a year higher in 1991-92. The difference  is approximately  equal to the
region's total scheduled  debt service payments  in this period.  In practice, part of this
gain might have been lost because of lower prices resulting from increased supplies.
However, Africa's competitors might not have expanded their exports so much had
African countries been stronger exporters.
During the 1960s, African agricultural exports grew at nearly 2% a year.  But
since then, they have declined sharply - by more than 3% a year.  Africa's share of
exports for most of its major crop exports also fell during the 1970s and early 1980s,
demonstrating  that the problem was largely an African  one.  For example, between 1970s
and 1980s, Africa's world market share for three main agricultural exports  - coffee,
cocoa and cotton - shrank by 22, 12 and 18 percent respectively. Indonesia  which used
to produce 16,000 tons of cocoa in 1980  exported more than 220,000 tons in 1990. Of
the seven major agricultural  exports, market shares rose only for tea and tobacco (Table
III).
The structure of Sub-Saharan  exports has remained  largely unchanged since the
early 1960s. The heavy reliance on primary commodities  (including  oil) persists; they
accounted for 93 percent of total export earnings in 1970, declining  to 84 percent by the
end of the  1980s.  A few countries, suCil  as Kenya and Mlauritius,  have diversified
somewhat  out of primary products, but they remain the exception. The markets for SSA
exports have also changed little.  Roughly  half of the region's exports still go to the EC.
African exporters have yet to take advantage  of the booming markets  of Asia.  For most
of St'  Saharan Africa, growth in imports has tended to outpace growth in exports,
gener..dng a  ma:or foreign exchange constraint and impinging on overall economic
growth.  This consrraint  was particularly  acute in the 1980s. This was the result in part,
of thu adoption  of  mniport  substitution  policy, and in part to inconsistent  macroeconomic
policy.  While terms of trade deterioration played a  role such deterioration was no-5-
greater than those faced by other developing  countries.  Within Africa, when cocoa and
coffee  terms of trade improved  in the 1970s, Cote d'Jvoire fared notably better while the
performance of Ghana and IJganda at that time was pocr.  Several African countries
export a very large fraction r.  their GDP and decreases in the prices they receive for
their commodity  exports may represent large percentage cuts in their real incomes. To
the extent that they are able to increase their export quantities the real income decline
will be curtailed.  This  is essentially an empirical question that was explored by
Gersovitz and Paxon.2' They tested the relationship  between the changes in the terms
of trade and economic  performance  for twenty-four  countries for the period 1974-83  but
did not find  any statistically  significant  relationship.
The history of commodity  prices suggests  4' that th, re is no systematic  tendency
for these prices to continue to decline, and mary prices may have a tendency  to return
to higher values. Even for those  commodities  w th highly persistent  prices, a substantial
fraction of the shocks that lowered prices can be expected to dissipate over time.
Effects  of Terms of Trade
The evolution  of the barter terms of trade varies for different groups  of countries
and has changed significantly  over time.  For the SSA region as a whole, terms of trade
fell sharply in the  1980s, although the decline was from the historically high level
attained in 1981. Despite the fall, the terms of trade  were 34 percent  higher in 1989
than in 1967. The loss in income caused by deteriorating  terms of trade between 1985
and 1990 was far less than the gains up to the mid-1980s. Although  declining  terms of
trade result in depressed levels of income, the region gained more income (at consiant
prices) since 1961 from terms of trade changes than it lost. 5'  Only in the last two
years, as a result r-F the recession in the OECD countries, has the decline in the terms
of trade resulted in sharply reduced incomes.
At a disaggregated  level, the impact of the terms of trade has been uneven  and
not necessarily  in the same direction for oil exporters, mineral  exporters  and agriculture
exporters.  Between 1970 and 1990, oil exporters enjoyed improvements  of more than
100  percent while mineral  exporters were hardest hit: their terms of trade fell by around
50  percent.  Agriculture exports suffered a  decline of  34  percent while the  more
diversified exports 30 percent.
3/  Gersovitz,  M. and C. H. Paxon.  1990.  'The  Econornies of Africa and the Prices of Their
Exports".  Princeton:  Studies in International Finance.
41  rbid.
5/  World  Bank. 1989. "Sub-Saharan  Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth." Washington,
D.C.- 6 -
The income loss from the  aecline  in the terms of trade for the region (excluding
Nigeria) was around 10 percent of GDP between 1965-73  and 1987-90. Though large,
the 'oss was spread over 20 years.  Adding Nigeria to the picture reduces the 20-year
loss to just 3.6 percent of GDP or 0.2 percent a year.  The losses were biggest for
mineral exporters (around 20 percent of GDP for the whole period) and much more
moderate  for the agricultural  exporters  (around  4 percent of GDP). Oil exporters  gained
from higher prices - around 4% of C.PP.
The terms of trade losses  are not unique  to SSA. In fazt, other developing  regions
experienced  a more severe deterioration  in .heir terms of trade in the 1980s, but their
export volumes still grew at a rapid rate. Betwe,.n 1980-88,  East Asia's terms of trade
fell by about 16 percent compared to only 8 percent for SSA.  But East Asia was able
to expand its exports at an annual rate of 10.4 percent while SSA's exports declined by
an average  0.7 percent annuaJly  daring the same period. Latin America's terms of trade
declined by some 14 percent but its exports grew by 3.4 percent a year.
At a country level, the situation  is more differentiatee. Several African  countries
are  distinguished from those in  other regions of  the  world by  the  fact that three
commodities  of which Africa is a major exporter -- Coffee, Cocoa and Copper-- were
severely depressed over the decade of the 1980s and their real prices had dropped to
their historically low levels  (although  copper prices had rebounded  in the later half of
the  decade).  Countries deriving their export revenues mainly from any of  these
.ommDdities  were indeed badly hurt.  But it is interesting that the response of each of
the affected countries was highly varied and no gene~ralized  conclusions  can be drawn.
Though most countries in  the region suffered a  significant decline in export
revenues  in the period 1970-8- the main cause  of the decline  were falling  export volumes
and not the de^lining terms of trade.§'  By contrast, for the period 1986-91 the terms
of trade fell by about 10 percent while the volume of exports increased bv almost 30
percent.  In an earlier less favorable period (1954-69) in the terms of trade, export
revenues grew significanty mainly  due to increases in export volume.
Pickett 2' attempted to assess the effects on GDP growth of long-run terms of
trade  for a sample of twenty SSA low income countries over 1966-86.  In all the 20
countries  he examined  the income effects  of the terms of trade were negative, but in most
cases the effect was quite modest. Worst hit were three mineral  exporters --  Zambia,
Zaire and Mauritania. For the others, the income effects were relatively small,reducing
6/  Svedherg,  Peter.  1991.  'The  Export  Performance  of Sub-Saharan  Africa."  In J.H.  Frimpong-
Ansah,  et al.  "Trade and  Development  in Sub-Sahara  Africa."  Manchester:  Manchester  University
Press.
7/  Pickett,  James.  1990. "The  Low-income  Economies  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  Problems  and
Prospects."  In J.  Pickett and  H.  Singer,  eds.  Towards  Econoinic  Recovery  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
London:  Routledge.estimated annntal  GDP growth by less than a third of a percentage point.Y'  Even for the
hardest hit country -- Zambia -- the terms of trade deterioration  can explain  only one
percentage point of the 3.4 percent reduction  in GDP growth in the past two decades.
Export Volume  vs. Export Revenue:  Fallacy of ComDosition
It  is often  irgued that increases in volume of  primary exports may not bet
accompanied  by increases in export revenue if many  -untries increased their exports
the  same time.  Th« argument is  that with  a  generally inelastic world demand
aggressive  increases in supply by all countries will lower world prices.
This "fallacy of composition"  argument is unconvincing. African  production  for
most commodities  (excluding  cocoa, coffee, and copper) is a relatively small (less than
20%) share of the world market.  Even doubling production would have a small effect
on total world supply.
Akiyama and Larson 2' have empirically tested the valid of  this argumnent  by
estimating the elasticity of export revenue (ERV) with respect to volume, which is the
percentage change in export revenue when export quantity  is increased by one percent.
If expansion of export quantity  has no effect on world prices, then the elasticity would
be equal to one.  If the world prices decline as a result of expansion  of export quantity,
then the elasticity would be less than one.  A negative  elasticity means that increase in
export quantity causes export revenue to decline.  The estimates  of ERV are higher in
the long-run than in the short-run.
The results of this study show that cocoa is the only commodity that faces a
serious adding up problem.  In the short-run, the ERV for cocoa is -0. 19 which mneais
that a 10  percent increase  in export quantities  will reduce export revenues by 1.9 percent.
For the long-run, the ERV is 0.33.  Cote d'lvoire, and to some extent, Ghana are the
two countries that face this problem.  The best way in the short-run to address this
problem is  for both these countries to  impose an export tax which will discourage
inefficient  producers. In the long-run  productivity-enhancing  technologies  may lower the
marginal cost of incremental  production.
An argument is also advanced that structural adjustment programs in SSA, by
expanding  supply and exports of primary commodities,  have depressed world prices.  A
number  of SSA countries  depend  on a few primary commodities  -- cocoa, coffee, cotton,
sugar, tea and tobacco -- for a large share of their export earnings.  The share of these
8/  El-Farhan's study also comes to similar conclusions.  Although there was a positive association
between the terms of' trade and GDP  growth, this was generally not significant.
2/  Akiyam.,  T. and D. Larson. 'Adding up Probilem  - Strategies for Primary CoInmodity Expcrts in
Sub-Saharan Africa. (World Bank, processed 1993).-8-
five crops in the total agricultural commodity  exports is about two-third.  Only in two
primary commodities  -- cocoa ana coffee -- SSA's  share of the world  market is high.
Thus, in the short-run, increases  in export of these crops by SSA as a whole would not
increase the region's export revenues from these comarmodities.  In the case of coffee, no
SSA country has a large market share.  Lience, at the individual countiy level, the
"adding up" problem does not exist.  Furthermore, tno  SSA country has expanded
production substantially  in recent years.  MJst of price-depressing  expansion has been
in Colombia, Indonesia  and Viet Nam.
The story of cocoa markets is different. As notedl  above, there is an "adding up"
problem in case of cocoa.  The question is whether .xports from Ghana and Nigeria
under their  strucwural  adjustment program are  the  main contributory factor to  the
depressed world prices.  Coleman, et al '° have recently analyzed the impact of cocoa
export increases in  major Sub-Saharan producing countries, on  world prices and
production  of cocoa using a large si-uiltaneous  equation  model  of the world cocoa market
consisting of three blocks: supply, demand and price determination.  The simulation
results show that world cocoa prices would have been on average 8% higher and the
value of world cocoa production 6% higher on average had there not been structural
adjustnient programs  in  Ghana and  Nigeria over  the  period  1982/83 - 1989/90.
According to  the  simulation results,  world cocoa prices  would  have been about
US$1,060/ton, instead of $980 in the late 1980s, had there not been SAPs in Ghana and
Nigeria.  The incremental exports  -- cocua from Ghana and Nigeria -- have made only
a small contribution  to decline  in world prices. The major part of the world cocoa price
decline in the 1980s  can be attributed to the rapid production  irncreases  in other countries
-- Cote d'Ivoire,  Indonesia and Malaysia.
In any event, Africa cannot afford to adopt a passive role and lose even larger
market shares to more aggressive  Asian and Latin American exporters. That producers
compete for markets is a fundamental reality, as true for manufacturing as it is for
primary products.  During the 1970s, it was aggressive exporting on the part of other
developing  country  producers  and the disastrous  macro  policies  pursued by some  A  Irican
producers that eroded Africa's expo-  share, compounded  by agricultural subsidies in
developed  countries.  As SSA countries become low cost producers due to the policy
reforms they have adopted, they will displace other competitors  who have relatively
higher marginal costs without affecting world prices.
Industrial  Country's Protectionism  Against  Africa's Manufactured  Exports
Although most countries in SSA have found it difficult to reallocate  resources to
manufactured exports  successfully,  there  is pervasive concern about industrial country
10/  Coleman, J.R.,  T. Akiyama and P.N. Varanges. "Impacts of Policy Changes on Cocoa Sectors in
Major Sub-Saharan Producing Countries'  (World Bank, processed 1992).- 9 -
protectionism aga,inst such exports.  This ccr.cern and the resultinig  pessimism are,
however, unwarraii  zd.
A detailed study of protection  facing SSA exports in the EC, Japan and the U.S.
markets "'  rules out protection in the industrial country markets as the cause of  the
relatively poor export performance  in manufacturers  of SSA countries.  Iii fact, it was
found tt.iat  SSA had more favora'  - arrangements  ir. terms of both tariff and non-tariff
barriers  against  their  exports  in those markets.
Africa  is a beneficiary  of the GSP under the GATT, while the Lome Convention
grants African countries  virtually free access to the EC market.  though African  exports
of primary  commodities  typically  face low tariff rates and  quantitative  restrictions, t'
market access for manufacturers is no', a  problem at all.  1'  Some SSA countrics
benefitted  from protection  becv'jse industrial  country  protectionism  restricts or bars non
SSA developing  countries' exports more than that of SSA exports.
Import liberalizatioL aNd  Exports
Despite  some success  in import liberalization  in a number  of countries, protection
is still appreciably  higher in SSA than in other developing  regions. Though the average
level of tariffs and other ad valorem import duties is about 30 percent, non-tariff import
barriers in different  forms, including  quantitative  restrictions, foreign  exchange  controls
and *.ate  trading p  ,vide  a high degree of protection to import substitutes.
It has long been recognized that restrictions on imnports  effectively  tax exports,
particularly  those which rely on intermediate  imported inputs  or raw materials. The unit
cost of  export production rises proportionately.'"'  By implicitly taxing exports and
thereby reducing  international  competitiveness,  tariffs  and other import restrictions  often
11/  Erzan, Refik and Peter Svedberg. 1991.  'Protection Facing Exports from Sub-Saharan Africa in
the EC, Japan and the U.S."  In J.H.  Frimnpong-Ansah,  et al., eds.  1rade and Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa,  Manchester: Manchester University Press.
12/  However, African countries do frequently encounter obstacles to trade in some agricultural
commodities in which they could be competitive, such as beef.
13/  It is estimated that the protectionist policies of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) benefits SSA as
it is a net importer of cereals and sugar.  Liberalization of CAP would reduce welfare in those
food importing countries.  In Ulrich Koester and Malcolm D. Bale "The Common Agricultural
Policy: A review of its operation and effects on Developing  Countries."  World Bank Research
Observer, 5(1) January 1990.
14/  Lerner, A.P. 'The  Symmetry Between Import and Export Taxes."  Economica, August 1936.
Clements, K.W. and L.R. Sjaastad. "How Protection Taxes Exporters." Trade Policy Center,
London, 1984.- 10  -
foreclose possibilities  for expanding  exports.  Several studies " of the tax incidence  of
import substitution  on exports show  that specially  administered  systems  of incentives  that
are often used to offset the tax and promote or diversify exports have generally  not been
very effectivC.  In simple terms, providing greater freedom to import improves the
incentives for expanding exports in the most efficient manner.  A recent study has
modelled  the export incentive  of imports for SSA.  Using available estimates of trade
elasticities, it finds that if import  duties are reduced to a uniform rate of only 10 percent
and non-tariff  barriers are dismantled, exports are estimated  to increase by between 15
percent and 33 percent.'  The study also shows that protection in SSA inhibits the
progress of African countries in achieving  greater export diversification.
Countra-Spciric Evidence
Different  cross-country studies of adjustment  policies and growth in SSA show
one outcome consistently across countries and across different time periods - that
domestic  economic  policy reforms  which include import  policy  reforms have contributed
to  significantly improving exports performance.  Using several estimation methods
including  modified  control group approach  in which the initial conditions  and internal  and
external shocks were controlled.  El-Badawi,  et al..'  found that the estimated marginal
effect of  adjustme;.  program on  SSA export performance was positive and highly
significant.  After controiling for other factors, adjustment  programs were estimated  to
have increased the export to GDP ratio of the intensive~  adjusters by 8 percent compared
to other countries ir. the region.
There is also a good deal of country-specific  evidence  in Africa to substantiate  the
positive relationship between import liberalization  and export growth.  Econometric
studies Ih/  of  Malawi and  Tanzania show that  when import liberalization reduces
protection and depreciates the real exchange rate, primary exports rise rapidly.  The
same has been true of Ghana and Uganda. Import liberalization  in Mauritius led to a
rapid expansion  of manufactured  exports.
The recent experience of  Nigeria provides another interesting and  pertinent
illustration  of import liberalization  prompting  export expansion. Since 1986, Nigeria has
15/  World  BaiLk, World  Development  Renort.  1987.
16/  DeRosa,  Dean.  'Protection  and  Export  Performance  in Sub-Saharan  Africa"  Weltwirschaftlicheo
Archiv,  128,1  (1992).
17/  El-Badawi,  1. D.  Ghura  and Uwujaren,  'World  Bank Adjustment  Lending  and Economic
Performance  in Sub-Saharan  Atrica  in the  1980s",  PRE  Working  Paper  1000 (October  1992).
_8/  Lopez,  Ramon.  "Trade  and Macroeconomic  Policies  and Agricultural  Exports"  (World  Bank,  PRE
Working  Paper  No.  921,  1991).- 1 1  -
implemented substantial import liberalization. '9'  Although official export statistics
underestimate the  true response to  this set of  measures, Katherine Moseley ?()'  has
documented  the evidence of 'informal' exports from Nigeria to the West African sub-
region. "'  She notes that "Made in  Nigeria" has become a  common epithet in the
region rather like "Made in Japan" or  "Made in Taiwan" at the global level.  The
ultimate  boundaries of this distribution network  are not yet precisely known, but might
be as far away as Zaire, for instance, or, to the west, Conakry, Guinea.
In the early 1980s, about one-half of the annual Nigerian cloth consumption  of
some 200 million meters was imported.  Nigerian cloth exports were making serious
inroads into these same regional  markets from where it used to import. Nigerian  textiles
are now estimated  to supply as much as 30% of the needs of the low income groups in
the West African sub-region  as a whole.  Similar developments  have been reported for
other goods.  Spare parts for Peugeot cars, cosmetics, medicines, cassette recordings,
shoes, manufactured foods and detergents are  now common exports to  the region.
Moseley notes that, although export production is often associated  with the large-scale
MNCs, in Nigeria, it was the indigenous  small- and medium-sized  firms which lead the
export drive to the sub-region.
Inappropriate  Ixnpcrt  Composition  After Liberalization
Concerns about the disruptive effects of import liberalization -- inappropriate
import composition, trade deficits and deindustrialization  -- are overstated.  They are
certainly not inevitable nor intrinsic to liberalization. In most cases such effects arise
because import liberalization are  not accompanied  by complementary poli^ies.  For
example, import liberalization  accompanied  by financial  sector reform  or by appropriate
exchange  rate adjustmenits  can avoid most of the disruptive  transitional  effects discussed.
It is often asserted that one of the pernicious  effects  of import  liberalization  is the
unrestricted  flow of consumer  goods and especially luxury goods at the expense of raw
materials  and capital goods needed for investment  and growth. Where thiis  has happened
19/  Nigeria abolished import licensing and removed all quantitaive restrictions with the exception of a
few commodities, lowered the average tariff rates,devalued its currency substantially. allowed the
non-oil exporters  100 percent retention of foreign exchange proceeds, decontrolled all output and
input prices, except petroleum products and fertilizers and allowed producer prices to be
determined by the market.
20/  Moseley, K. 'Seizing the Change: Economic Crisis and Industrial Restructuring in Nigeria."  In J.
Nyang'oro and T.M.  Shaw, eds.,  1992.  Beyond Structural Adiustment in Africa.  New York:
Praeger.
21/  These exports are taking place "unofficially" because of various considerations involving
overvalued exchange rates of neighbors and their high tariffs, import bans in importing countries,
corruption and red tape encountered at customs even for legal imports  All this makes "informal"
exports often the more attractive route.- 12 -
it is either because pre-liberalization  restrictions on common goods led to a pent-up
demand or because of imperfections  in the financial  market.
The available  evidence  for a group of liberalizing  SSA countries, does not support
the claim that intermediate  and capital goods have been "crowded out" and that import
liberalization  has opened the door for 'undesirable' and 'anti-development'  imports.  A
sample survey of 27 adjusting low income countries in SSA for the  period 1988-92
shows  that capital  goods and intermediate  goods accounted  for 67% of total impolts, fcod
about 16%, fuel 4% and consumer  goods only 13%.  Ten years ago the share of capital
and intermediate  goods was only 54%, followed by food 26%, fuel 8% and consumer
goods 12%.  Though imports grew from $7.7 billion to $11.6 billion, a cumulative
increase of about 50%, the share of consumer  goods has not declined.  Only the share
of food imports has declined after liberalization. The declining  dependence  of African
countries on food imports during the adjustment period is largely due to the expansion
of domestic food production.22'  Lower world prices of petroleum  products has also led
to a dramatic fall in fuel imports.  On the other hand, raw materials  and capital goods
imports needed to increase utilization  of existing capacity and new investment  has been
picking up over the last five years.
Generation  of Trade Deficits
Import  liberalization,  if unaccompanied  by offsetting  macroeconomic  policies,  will
generate trade deficits in any economy. This is not only true if there is macroeconomic
disequilibnium  in the pre-liberalizatiorn  period but also true if there is macroeconomic
stability prior to liberalization. This is because import liberalization  reduces domestic
prices of  imports thereby, raising import demand."'  If the economy starts from a
position of  macroeconomic balance,  either  the  exchange rate  has  to  depreciate
sufficiently  to offset the decline in the average domestic price of imports or monetary
policy has to become more restrictive to ensure that import liberalization  does not
generate trade deficits.  If the  economy starts from a  position of  macroeconomic
imbalance  (e.g. trade deficit), the offsetting  policy changes have to be greater.  Failure
to depreciate the real exchange rate sufficiently has generally been a  key factor in
worsening the balance of payments situation  after liberalization.
Countries  in SSA have  often failed to implement  complementary  macroeconomic
policies with  import  liberalization.  For  example, Kenya implemented substantial
22/  Food aid to SSA has almost halved from 4.8 million tons in 1985 to 2.5 million tons in 1990.  The
volume data on total food imports for the same period shows a similar trend - down from  11.0
million tonv to 7.7 million tons.
23/  Under a monetary model of balance of payments, a decline in domestic prices of imports reduces
the domestic price level (price level decline is greater, larger the state of imports in GDP).  This
raises real supply of money balances and for any given  money demand, results in an outflow of
reserves.- 13 -
liberalization  of its quantitative  restrictions in 1989  and 1990, but fdiled to depreciate  its
exchange rate sufficiently.4' As a result. there was pressure on the trade balance and
an implicit reversal of import liberalization  in the late 1990 and in early 1991 as the
Government tried to prevent an outflow of reserves by increasing the length of time
necessary  to attain import licenses. Franc Zone countries  have experienced  a similar fate
as their real exchange  rate appreciated  rather than depreciated  after import liberalization.
This experience  is not unknown  outside Africa, especially  in the Southern  Cone countries
of Latin America.
De-Industrialization of Africa
A number of observers have  expressed the fear that liberal flow of imports  would
crowd out domestic manufactured  products and lead to de-industrialization  of Africa.
The evidence behind these assertions is at best anecdotal and spotty and the actual
examples of the closing down of firms are hard to find.  The effective  protection rates
are still not that low in many countries, although  some reduction has taken place.
In principle, it is necessary  to distinguish  between the short term and medium-to-
long term aspect of  the question.  In the short-run, it is possible to  minimize the
disruptive  effects on existing manufacturing  firms by offsetting  the decline in the average
domestic price of imports with an exchange rate depreciation. To the extent that pre-
liberalization tariffs (explicit and implicit) were not uniform, the higher than average
tariffs will experience some  contraction. But the overall adverse  effect  on manufacturing
output will be minimized  by the "compensated"  depreciation. In the long run non-viable
firms will close but new firms will open.  The only issue is how long before the new
firms emerge.
Over-valued exchange rates, high tariff and non-tariff protection, subsidized
interest rates and other incentives  had promoted  a pattern of industrialization  in SSA that
was highly  import-intensive  and capital  intensive. This conclusion  is shared by the critics
of structural adjustment such as Stewart, et al 25  who state that "while industrial output
grew at a rate comparable to that of other areas in the world before the 1980s, the
pattern of industrialization vas, for the most part, inefficient  by every measure, highly
protected, highly import-dependent,  with very few linkages with the rest of the economy
and associated  with very low levels of export".
24/  Matin,  Kazi,  et al.  "Kenya:  The Challenge  of  Promoting  Exports"  (Chapter  5).  UINDP/World
Bank  TEP  Report,  Decem-ber 1992.
25/  Stewart,  F.,  et al.  1992.  "Alternative  Development  Strategies:  An Overview."  In Stewart  F.,  S.
Lall  and S.  Wangwe.  Alternative  Develorment  Strategies  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  London:
MacMillan.- 14 -
The policy reforms initiated since the mid-1980s  in many countries have tended
to change the prevailing incentive structure and favor raw material based and labor
intensive industries.  This reallocation of resources cannot take place without some
transitional  social costs in terms of unemployed  labor, under-utilized  capacity, financial
losses and increased indebtedness  in the previously thriving industries.  On the other
hand, the emergence of new competitive  industries that require fresh investment takes
time and is often relatively slow and uneven.  The factors determining investment are
complex and extend to non-economic  considerations  such as political stability, policy
credibility, etc.
Nevertheless, the buoyant growth of informal and small enterprises in Nigeria,
Tanzania, Ghana, and Uganda, following  import liberalization  and other policy reforms,
suggests that some reallocation of resources is already taking place and in the right
direction.  Moseley's  26' study  of  the  Nigerian  industrial  sector  confirms  the
responsiveness  of the firms and entrepreneurs to the policy changes.  Sourcing of local
raw materials  has become  the predominant  mode of adjustment  for most of the previously
import-dependent  industries. There has also been a marked shift in capacity utilization
and production away from industries such as vehicle assembly, paints and chemicals,
beverages, etc., to textiles, fabrics  and wood products -- products in which countries of
SSA have a larger comparative  advantage.
The  empirical  basis  of  "deindustrialization theory"  is  quite  shaky.  If
"deindustrialization"  is in fact resulting  as a consequence  of structural adjustment, this
can be observed  by comparing  the changes in the share  of industrial  value-added  in GDP
before and after adjustment  and examining  the growth rates.  An inspection  of the data
for 11 adjusting countries in SSA with a sizable industrial sector does not show any
decline in these shares.  On the contrary, average annual industrial growth rates in the
1988-91 period have been fairly high relative to the earlier periods -- (Uganda 11%;
Nigeria 7%; Malawi 7%; Ghana 5%; Kenya 5%; Zimbabwe  4%).
Openness and GDP growth
The foregoing suggest that the skepticisrii  in  respect of the outward oriented
strategy does not rest on firm or  solid grounds. This inference is strengthened  by the
results of recent cross-country  analysis iinking openness  with GDP growth.
The cross-country evidence for SSA now provides considerable support for a
positive relationship between increased trade liberalization and GDP growth.  This,
together with country specific evidence, undermines the traditional presumption that
openness  does not work in the SSA region. This cross-country  evidence is of two types:
one linking  export growth to GDP growth and the other linking measures  of trade policy
or openness with GDP growth.
26/  Moseley, K.,  ibid- 15  -
The evidence linking export to  GDP  growth consists of  two cross-country
econometric studies.  One study 27/ attempting  to explain the GDP growth of SSA for
the period 1970-86,  shows that the strongest  explanatory  variable is the growth of export
earnings; even when the import growth variable is introduced,the  result is unchanged.
i.e.  its coefficient remains significant  and with positive sign.  The other study 28/ for
a cross section of sixteen African countries (using  period-average  data)  shows a strong
positive relationship  between  export growth and GDP growth. These results demonstrate
the importance  of export growth in augmenting  the GDP growth in SSA, though it is not
obvious wkiether  they capture the fact that increased exports increase the capacity to
import and this relaxes the ir.1port  constraint  on growth or whether the growth of exports
arises from efficienc.y  increases generated  by trade liberalization.
The second type of cross-country  evidence is based on measures  of actual trade
policy rather than an effect of trade policy (i.e. export growth).  The evidence is nmuch
more convincing  because one does not have to assume that export growth is the effect
of trade liberalization. A cross-country  study of SSA,  29  for the period 1967-87,  using
an augmented  production function framework and pooled time series and cross section
data study found that differences in levels of or changes in openness accounted for
significant differences in economic performance in terms of the level and growth of
GDP.  The  study  uses  four  different measures of  openness --  index  of  trade
liberalization,mndex  of outward orientation, black market premium and the actual trade
shares  -- to investigate  the relationship  between  openness  and economic  performance.  The
econometric results are robust across all four measures.  In addition, estimates  of the
coefficient on  openness remain virtually unchanged when a  macroeconomic policy
variable is introduced ir; the regression."'  These results (i.e. coefficient estimates  on
openness)  compare quite favorably  with those for developing  countries in other regions.
Prospect
Since the prospects for significantly  higher prices for most primary commodities
are poor,  export earnings must grow through increasing the supply of exports and
through  diversification. Diversification  that is consistent  with the comparative  advantage
27/  El-Farhan, Hania. Analysis of the Growth Performance of Sub-Saharan African Countries 1960-85
(London: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis).  Cited in Killick, T. 'Explaining Africa's Post-Independence
Development  Experiences' (processed, 1992).
28/  A-Fosu. 'Exports  and Economic GroAth: African Case" World Development, Vol.  18, No. 6, June
1990.
29/  Matin, Kazi. 'Openness and Economic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa'  (World Bank, PRE
Working Paper, No.  1025, October 1992).
30/  In several cross-country studies of all countries from all regions positive coefficient on openness
was found to disappear when controls for macroeconomic  policy were introduced.- 16 -
of the country is an effective way to protect the country from the impact of large
fluctuations  in individual  commodity prices, as shown by the experience of South and
Southeast  Asian  countries. However,  although  diversification  will take  place  as economic
growth is accelerated, in the short- and medium-term  countries must seek to expand
traditional  exports since it will take time to establish  a i.ew product as a major export.
Managing  the commodity  price risk by using financial  risk management  measures will
certainly  help in reducing  the volatility  in export earnings. In any event it would be best
to  provide neutral incentives for exports and  to  avoid  targeted policies that  may
misallocate  resources.  Governments,  after all, are generally bad at picking winners.
Encouragingly, during the past 15 years or  so,  some African countries have
managed to find new opportunities in world markets for certain primary commodities
such as  vegetable oils,  soybeans and fishery products.  Kenya has had success in
exporting fruits, vegetables and flowers.  However, with the exception of Mauritius,
countries have not diversified  significantly  into labor-intensive  light manufacturing,  and
Africa's few manufactured  exports remain processed primary products with little value
added.
SSA also needs to find new markets in addition to taking full advantage  of its
preferential access to  European Community markets.  Although Europe has  seen
declining imports from developing countries (down from 34% to 20% in  1970-85),
imports into the US, now the biggest market for developing  country exports and Asian
countries are  still growing.  Since the share of Asian markets and the slhare  of non-
traditional items in world trade is likely to grow rapidly, special marketing  efforts will
have to be made to enter this market. Competition  in international  markets will remain
intense, but continued economic growth worldwide could expand demand for African
exports.  African countries need to expand trade with each other.
In the World Bank's scenario for SSA, the ratio of exports to GDP is targeted to
rise from an annual  average of about 19% in 1986-87  to about 24% by 2000 and to 28%
by 2020; the growth rate of exports should improve significantly  from a negative rate in
1980-87 to about 5% a year, thus reversing the decline in Africa's share of primary
exports.
Africa will be affected more than any other region by the likely slow growth in
demand for primary commodities. Any hope of a revival of economic  growth predicated
on the recovery of primary commodity  prices would seem to be misplaced. The price
forecasts for Africa's five major primary commodity exports to the year 2000 do not
show any significant  increases.  Except for oil, prices are now close to their long-term
trend.  While Africa can and must seek to expand its market share wherever it has a
comparative advantage,  it  is  clearly  not  advisable to  divert more  resources  into
commodities  or sectors that have a long-term declining  unit value.
Africa's export performance indicates the continent's unrealized potential.  The
average annual growth rate of exports from SSA fell from 6.6% in 1965-80  to -0.7% in- 17 -
1980-90. The expansion of world trade during the past three decades appears to have
largely bypassed  Africa.  If its economies  are to grow, they must improve their share in
world markets and diversify their exports.- 18 -
AID
Despite a resurgence in exports, Africa wili continue to face a foreign exchange
shortage  well into the next  century. African  countries have  scope for using imports more
efficiently as  well as  for  reducing non-essential and  food imports.  As domestic
production grows, domestic products can substitute for imports, particularly in high
value-added  goods.  Nonetheless, in the 1990s, imports would need to grow faster than
GDP to make up for the compression  that has occurred during the past decade. Imports
in the 1990s will need to grow by 5 to 6 percent a year.  Recent experience with strong
adjustment  programs suggests  import  elasticity  of 1.5 percent. It is assumed  that success
in  increasing food production will curb the growth in  food imports, and,  given the
projected rise in investment 15 to 25 percent of GDP, imports of capital goods will rise
faster than income.  To meet these growing import requirements, external resources in
the form of aid or concessional  loans would have to supplement the region's export
earnings.  This section  examines the past trends and pattern of external resource flows,
assesses the debt burden and the various initiatives taken so far and !ooks at the future
prospects.
Trends  and Pattern of External Flows
It is often asserted that the external resource flows to SSA have declined and the
region is being marginalized.  How far is this fear well founded?  It is true that the
volume of external resources available  to SSA in real terms declined until 1985, but has
risen in the latter half of the 1980s. The increase in external resources as a proportion
of the region's GDP is dramatic.  Aggregate net resource flows have risen from 6.2
percent of the region's GDP in 1980 to 10.7 percent in 1990.3A'  If all adjustments  are
made for total debt servicing,  profits, remittances,  dividends,  payments  made to the IMF,
the region as a whole received 7.4% of GDP in 1990 from all extemal sources
(Table IV).  This compares with 6.2% in 1980 and 3.3% in 1970.
The composition  of external resource flows has also changed significantly  during
the last decade. While net borrowing through  loans accounted for more than -v  vo-thirds
of total resLurces flows in 1980, this source has been diminishing in importance  and
provided only 28 percent of total resources in 1990.  Of all resource flows, Official
Development Assistance (ODA) has grown the  fastest.  Official grants (excluding
technical assistance) now comprise more than two-thirds of external flows to SSA,
reflecting the increasingly limited  access SSA countries have to commercial funds and
31/  The above  estimates  do not include  technical  cooperation  grants  which  amounted  to $4.5 billion  in
1990.  Including  these grants  the aggregate  net tlows  rose to $21.8 billion  or  13.4 percent  of the
GDP of SSA.- 19 -
the growing recognition  that more concessional  assistance  is needed. The type and terms
at which external assistance is being currently provided is highly appropriate in view of
the present level of severe indebtedness  of most countries in the SSA.
Net ODA disbursements  in real terms,which are used interchangeably  in this
paper as the indicator of aid flows, have grown at an annual rate of 2 percent between
1980 and 1990 for the developing countries as a whole. But for the SSA, ODA has
grown by almost 4.0 percent a year in the period, from $12 3 billion in  1980 to $18
billion a decade later -- an almost 50 percent increase in real terms.  Consequently,the
share of SSA in net ODA disbursements  in 1990  has risen from a fourth in 1980  to about
one third of total flows.
ODA flows from multilateral sources expanded more rapidly -- 4.6  percent
annually -- while bilateral ODA increased by 3.4 percent.  Among the multilateral
agencies, IDA's net disbursements  have risen consistently  in every year since 1985.  By
1992, the  region accounted for 48  percent of  IDA's  worldwide net disbursements
compared with just 31 percent as recently as 1985.As a result of the large increase in
IDA disbursements,net  flows from the World Bank  to SSA grew from $1.3 billion a year
in 1985 to $2 billion in 1992.
The relative importance  of aid in financing  Africa's development  can be seen in
comparison  with other developing  countries and in changes over time.  In 1985-86,  the
year before a large upsurge in adjustment  programs in SSA, ODA receipts  accounted  for
5 percent of SSA's regional GDP but by 1990-91  this had more than doubled to 10.8
percent.  At the same time, Asia and North Africa and the Middle East received only 1
percent of their GDP from ODA anid  Latin America  0.5 percent. Overall, ODA accounts
for 1.3 percent GDP of the developing  countries.
While the aid is necessary to finance the imports and investment  necessary for
growth and development  in SSA, a high level of aid transfer may  lead to dependency  and
a decline in domestic savings, overvalued  exchange  rates, and high wage rates.  With a
proper policy framework, however, such transfers can be associated  with high growth
rates and appropriate  wage  and exchange  rates. In Korea, for example, resource transfers
amounted to about 10 percent of GDP throughout  the 1960s and 1970s, and impressive
growth rates of GDP and exports as well as high investment  rates were achieved while
maintaining  competitive  exchange rates and wages.  In Africa, however, the resource
transfers of the same order of magnitude  in the late 1980s have generated  growth rates
of oniy 3 to 4 percent and even lower investment rates.  Efficiency in resource use
leading to accelerated growth is the only viable way to sustain these high levels of aid
flows to the region in the 1990s.
An important issue that is often raised is whether ODA flows have compensated
African countries for their terms of  trade losses.  We agree with  Helleiner that a
preferred approach to examine this issue is to look at the country-by-country  situation- 20 -
rather than at SSA in the aggregate.  Helleiner 32'  has analyzed the country-level data
for twenty six SSA countries for the period 1980-90  to examine whether the tt-ms of
trade losses suffered  by these countries  were offset by increased  ODA. Twenty countries
experienced term of trade losses averaging 28%.  The average loss of the losers was
8.3%  of GDP. 33,  The study showed that twelve of  the 26 countries either enjoyed
terms of trade improvements  or ODA increases that more than compensated  for terms
of trade losses over the  1980s.  The countries that suffered the most were four oil
exporters - Nigeria, Congo, Cameroon  and Gabon which  are not the recipients  of ODA -
and two cocoa exporters - Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana.  In addition, Sudan, Somalia,
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mauritania  had decreases  in their ODA during this period for
reasons unrelated  to economic  performance. It would be fair to surmise that outside the
low middle income countries the donors, by and large, met the financial  needs of most
of the adjusting  countries to cope with external shocks. The volume, and timing may not
have been perfect in each single case but their efforts need to be recognized. The recent
example of  the donor financing for drought related imports in the Southern Africa
reinforces this observation.
This analysis broadly suggests that the international  cor.mmunity  has responded
positively since 1986 to reorient its aid flows to the region and that the increase in ODA
to SSA has been consistently  and significantly  higher than that to other regions,  and to
developing  countries as a whole during the 1980s.  It also suggests that the type and
terms of the new commitments  of aid  and loans are appropriate from the viewpoint  of
servicing  future obligations  and financing  current import  needs; the average  grant element
of all new long term commitments  increased  from less than  20 percent in the early 1980s
to 50 percent by the end of the decade (if actual grants are included, the overall grant
element of financial  flows reached  more than 70 percent for SSA). Continued  assistance
of the same volume, type and terms has to be sustained  in the 1990s.
Multilateral  agencies have mobilized special additional finance for low-income
African countries. Through the World Bank's Joint Program of Action  for Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Special  Facility for Africa mobilized  almost $2 billion  in non-project  aid and
joint cofinancing  of structural adjustment  programs from mid-1985 to mid-1988. The
World Bank also launched  a three-year Special Program of Assistance  (SPA) for low-
income, debt-distressed Sub-Saharan African countries at  the  end of  1987, which
provides highly concessional,  quick-disbursing  finance. To be eligible, a country must
have a donor-endorsed  economic reform program with the World Bank and the IMF.
By the end of 1992, 26 countries were eligible for the program. The SPA has four main
elements: additional  disbursements  from IDA, concessional  adjustment  cofinancing  from
32/  Helleiner, G. K. 'Trade  Policy, Exchange Rates, and Relative Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Interpreting ,he  1980s".  (A paper presented at the Coriference in Gothenburg, Sweden, September
6-8,  1992.)
33/  If those countries which gained from terms or trade are included, the average loss for the whole
sample of 26 countries dwindles to 5.9 percent.- 21 -
bilateral  donors  and  other  multilateral agencies,  concessional rescheduling,  and
concessional financing of  interest  due  on  World  Bank  loans.  Eighteen donor
governments and agencies pledged an initial $6.4 billion in cofinancing,  about half of
which can oe considered additional  to existing aid programs.
In  1986, the  IMF established its Structural Adjustmeit  Facility to  provide
assist&nce  on concessional  terms (interest rates of 0.5 percent, with repayments  over a
10-year period  including 4.5  years  grace)  to  low-income countries  undertaking
comprehensive structural adjustment programs.  To enlarge the pool of concessional
resources available  to low-income  countries, the IMF established  the Enhanced  Structural
Adjustment  Facility, which became  effective  in January 1988. Donor contributions  have
provided new resources totaling $8.4 billion and the concessionality  of IMF resources
in Sub-Saharan  Africa has been increased. By 1992, 15 African  countries had access to
the enhanced facilities.- 22 -
DEBT
Any discussion of aid and external resource flows to Sub-Saharan  Africa will
remain partial without  considering  the region's burden  of debt. SSA's external  debt grew
rapidly throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  During this period of commodity boom and
petrodollar recycling, commercial creditors were able to  expand credit easily and
borrowers were happy to contract new loans at negative or low real interest rates.  At
the end of  1991, Africa's debt stood at $173 billion, more than three times the 1980
level.  SSA's debt was 111 percent of its GDP and  345 percent of exports. In  these
terms, this exceeds the debt burden of any other region.  Almost two-thirds  of Africa's
debt is owed to official creditors.
The net increase in debt stock is not largely due to new borrowing but to the
accumulation  of arrears of debt service  or interest capitalization. Most African  countries
are not fully servicing their debt.  In 1991, for example, the scheduled  amount of debt
service due was $20 billion.  Yet, African countries paid only 10 billion.  This has in
fact been the pattern for the last five years.  Interest arrears have climbed steadily from
$4.5 billion to over $14 billion between 1987  and 1992 and arrears on principal amount
to a further $20 billion.
To whom do African countries owe their debt?  Excluding short-term debt, the
sheres of the major creditors in the region's at the end of 1991 3' were as follows:
Bilateral governments  45%
Multilateral  agencies (incl. IMF)  30%
Commercial  banks  13%
Other private creditors  12%
The one-half of debt service  obligation  actually paid was divided among  creditors
as follows:
Bilateral  governments  22%
Multilateral  agencies (incl. IMF)  38%
Commercial banks  22%
Other private creditors  18%
A large proportion  of private debt is paid because the interest rate on this type of
debt is relatively high compared to that of bilateral  or multilateral  debt which is mostly
concessional.  Also,  two-thirds of the payments made to commercial  banks originate
from only two countiies - Nigeria  and Cote d'Ivoire.  The same  two countries  pay almost
34/  World Debt  Tables 1992-93  (World Bank, 1992).- 23 -
50 percent of Africa debt service  to other private creditors.  A majority of African
couritries make no attempt to service their debt to commercial  banks or other private
creditors, as they do not expect any new borrowings from thern.
Tables V and VI show the difference in the debt burden of SSA as a whoie and
for a group of 26 low-income  debt-distressed  SPA countries in the region who are the
main focus )f donor assistance. This group benefits from larger concessional  flows and
debt relief.  The debt structure of the region as a whole is also shifting towards more
concessionality  but the change is not as dramatic  in SPA countries,  where, the proportion
of concessional  debt has risen from 39 percent in 1980 to 61 percent in 1991. The debt
servicing ratio has declined to about 20 percent from 28 percent in 1987. Net transfers
from all sources to SPA  countries  amounted to 240 percent of debt service  paid in 1991.
Debt servicing pai(d  by these countries as a proportion of their export earnings and
aggregate net transfe:s taken together was only 15 percent. This has enabled  this group
to increase  their impons of goods and services by 6.2 percent annually  between 1987-92.
These aggregate figures of ', jb-Saharan African debt, however, mask the concentration
among  countries  of debt stock  and debt service  paid among African  countries. Ten large
countries - Nigeria, Cote d'ivJ  e, Sudan, Zaire, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon,
Congo and Ghana - accouit  for two-thirds of the debt stock outstanding.  The thirty
seven other countries  in the region account  only for a third of the debt outstanding. Five
countries  - Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire,  Ktiiya,  Zambia and Zimbabwe - pay two-thirds of the
region's actual debt service.
Almost all the ten large borrowers are severely indebted countries and some of
them are not yet eligible for concessional  debt relief.  Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon
and Congo, are still considered  low middle  income countries. If the bilateral  official  and
private debt stock of these ten countries  were reduced by one-half, the debt outstanding
of SSA would decline from $178 billion or  111 percent of GDP to $140 billion or 86
percent of GDP.
Mistry 35 has argued that African debt-service to multilateral institutions such
as the IBRD  has made these institutions  'the problem' rather than the solution. The facts
and analysis hardly support this assertion. In assessing  the role of the Bank Group, the
entire range of the lending instruments should be taken into consideration.  The first
instrument  is the IBRD i.e.  "hard-window"  or non-concessional  in nature and very few
countries in SSA are current borrowers from this window.  The second, and the most
predominant  source of financing  for SSA is the concessional  arm, i.e. IDA.  Finally, the
Bank  has introduced  a new instrument  in the form of the fifth dimension  facility to help
IDA-eligible  countries refinance their IBRD payments.  The Bank Group assistance is
closely linked to the recipient  countries' policies and performance.
35/  Mistry,  P. "African Debt: Options for the Futare'  (Paper prepared for UNICEF Meeting on Debt
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In response to the debt crisis of the 1980s  and the growing financial  difficulties
of most SSA countries, the Bank has made a conscious shift from hard window lending
to concessional  lending.  In the early 1970s, there were twenty four SSA countries that
were IBRD borrowers but by  1992 the number has dwindled to only six and most
countries started receiving concessional  IDA loans.  Consequently, net disbursements
from IDA to thirty seven SSA countries  have risen five-fold  from about $400 million  in
1980, to almost $2 billion in 1990.
The Bank has also been providing a portion of IDA reflows under the 'fifth
dimension' program as supplementary  adjustment  credits to countries that are currently
borrowers  of IDA-only  and thlat  have outstanding  IBRD  debt. Through  annual allocation,
the supplementary  IDA Credits have helped  ease the debt service burden of eligible IDA
- only borrowers who  are undertaking  adjustment  programs. A total of SDR 400 million
has been allocated  under the program since its inception  in 1988. In FY92, the allocation
amounted to SDR 118 million, equivalent to approximately  90 percent of the eligible
IBRD interest payments  due.
The total "hard-window"  or non-concessional  multilateral  debt of SSA at the end
of 1991 was about $14 billion, or 8 percent of the total debt stock; of this, the IBRD
debt was $9 billion, or 5 percent of the total debt.  Debt service on multilateral  debt is
about $2.0 billion or 10 percent of total debt service due and 3.7 percent of the region's
exports of goods and services.  On an aggregate  basis, the servicing  of non-concessional
multilateral  debt may appear onerous, but the burden is in fact limited to a handful  of
countries who are relatively better-off in terms of their export earnings, are capable  of
improved  economic  performance  with better economic  management  and can service this
debt without much difficulty.  Four countries -- Nigeria, Cote d'lvoire,  Kenya and
Cameroon, hold three-fourihs  of the IBRD debt stock.
Debt servicing  on IBRD  loans  claims only 4 percent of Nigeria's exports of goods
and services.  On the other hand, Nigeria's scheduled  debt service to its other creditors
amounts to 45 percent of exports. Its major problem is the net negative transfer of $2.5
billion made mostly to bilateral and private creditors and not the small amount of debt
service it makes to the IBRD.  For Cote d'Ivoire, the debt service on IBRD loan is 8.6
percent of its exports, while the debt service actually paid to all other creditors is about
32 percent of exports.  Nigeria  and Cote d'Ivoire have already become 'blend' countries
eligible for IDA financing. In Cameroon, the IBRD lending is minimal and the debt
service to  IBRD hardly exceeds 5 percent of exports.  Kenya is now receiving its
assistance entirely from IDA and has not contracted any new loan from IBRD since
1986.  Its debt servicing to IBRD is therefore steadily  declining and 90 percent of its
interest payments  to IBRD have been refinanced  through  concessional  IDA reflows since
1988.  In  1992, Kenya paid $162 billion in debt service to IBRD but received $257
million in new flows from the World Bank  Group.
The stock  of IBRD  debt in SSA countries, has, in fact, declined  between 1987  and
1991. For the low-income  SPA countries, the reduction in the IBRD debt stock is even- 25 -
much larger as they are no longer receiving  any new funds from the hard-window  of the
Bank  and all new commitments  are in the form of highly  concessional  IDA money. Debt
servicing Lj to the Bank Group - is about  150 million - 6 percent of total debt service
paid or 1.4 percent of exports of goods ano services.  Disbursements from the World
Bank Group to SPA  countries in 1990 were $1.7 bilion.  Net transfers from the Bank
Group to these 27 countries in the  1988-90  period exceeded  $1 billion annually  - more
than half the total debt related net transfers.  But it needs to be emphasized that net
transfer is not particularly  an appropriate  and meaningful  concept  as countries  could not
receive  net positive transfers in perpetuity. In case of low income Africa, the continued
positive transfers indicate the protracted nature of the economic difficulties that these
countries face and the response of the Bank Group to provide financial  assistance.
Debt Relief: A Menu of Options
Africa cannot  escape its present economic  crisis without significantly  reducing  its
debt burden.  Several important initiatives have been taken in recent years to provide
debt relief, and many new proposals are under consideration. Together they provide a
menu of options for keeping the actual debt service payments within manageable  limits.
These fall into two broad categories: debt reduction  and flexible and concessional  debt
rescheduling,  which postpones  debt service  payments  or reduces long-term  debt burdens,
and debt swaps.
Debt Reduction and Debt Rescheduling
Several donors such as Canada, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom have converted concessional  bilateral loans for low-
income countries to grants.  Sub-Saharan  Africa has also been the target of about two-
thirds of the worldwide cancellations  by creditors, far higher than its share of global
concessional  debt.ODA forgiveness  has accelerated  in the last three years. During the
1989-91  period some $10 to 11 billion  of concessional  debt was written off by the major
creditor countries.  France has decided  to write off concessional  debt owed by 35 of the
poorest African countries; the measure has resulted in cancellation  of some $3.4 billion
of debt.  Belgium  has also decided to  3ancel  the government-to-government  debt of 13
African  countries.  In 1989, Germany  canceled  $1.2 billion or 19 percent of debt owed
to it by African countries. In the same year, the United States announced  that beginning
in fiscal 1990  it would  forgive  development  assistance  (DA)  and Economic  Support Fund
(ESF) debt owed by  Sub-Saharan  African countries with reform programs.  To be
eligible, the debtor country must have in effect an IMF standby, a structural adjustment
enhanced facility, or a World Bank structural adjustment program.  The total amount
36/  1991 debt servicing paid figures are exceptionally high as they include Zambia's payment of past
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forgiven in the years 1990  and 1991  was approximately  $3.7 billion.  ro date, creditor
countries have canceled 11 percent of SSA's concessional  bilateral debt.
The scope for further relief through concessional debt cancellation is limited,
however, since scheduled payments on bilateral ODA debt is small.  The bilateral
concessional  debt owed by 26 low income adjusting countries at the end of 1991 was
about $15 billion, but at least one tourth of this belonged  to non Paris Club creditors  who
have not taken a lead in writing  off or canceling debt. As this debt is not being serviced
by most of the countries  any way the accumulation  of arrears is adding to the debt stock.
The main vehicle for restructuring bilateral official debt has been through the
Paris Club, where agreements  are reached  on a consensual  basis consistent  with equitable
burden sharing.  This restructuring includes both intergovernmental  loans and private
export credits guaranteed or insured by a creditor country agency.  The Paris Club has
divided the debt into two categories, pre-cut-off date and post-cut-off date debt and
restructures only the former.  The post cut-off debt represents about 11  % of total non-
concessional  bilateral debt owed to Paris Club creditors.
Traditionally,  bilateral  debt restructuring  had short consolidation  periods--at  most,
two years.  These were intended to provide an adequate amount of cash flow relief
required under adjustment  programs.  This approach was found suitable for countries
facing  liquidity  problems  but was not appropriate  for most African  countries  as they  were
in fact faced with a severe solvency crisis.  The initial response  of the Paris Club was
to restructure previously rescheduled  debt up to 100 percent of current maturities  and
arrears with a consolidation period up to three years.  During the second half of the
decade, the maximum  repayment terms were extended to 20 years including  a ten year
grace period.  But this was also found to be inadequate. In an attempt to explore more
generous terms of debt relief for low income countries, it was agreed at the June 1988
Toronto economic  summit that the d&bts  of IDA-eligible  countries could be rescheduled
by individual  creditor countries choosing among three options:
*  Forgiving one-third  of the debt service due on obligations
rescheduled  through the Paris Club.
*  Rescheduling all  eligible obligations at  market interest
rates, but over a very long time period (25 years' maturity
ard a grace period of 14 years).
*  Rescheduling  all eligible  obligations  at concessional  interest
rates with  long maturity (14 years,  including 8 years'
grace).
By September 1991  the Toronto initiative  was applied to 18 low-income  African
countries which obtained reschedulings  on a consolidated  debt of some $6 billion.  The- 27 -
average  grant element  was more  than 20 percent  on non-concessional  debt. Toronto terms
achieved debt reduction of about $1 billion in present value terms.
The debt relief offered by Toronto terms was insufficient to restore external
viability for many severely indebted countries.  In December 1991, a further step was
taken to implement a nevw  menu of enhanced concessions  -- the "Enhanced  Toronto
terms",  essentially two  options providing for  deeper det.  reduction,plus the  non
concessional option of  rescheduling over  25  years  at  market interest.  The  two
concessional  options amount to 50 percent forgiveness in present value terms on debt
service  payments falling due  during  the  consolidation per,cd.  Additionally, the
agreements provided for a deferred consideration  of potential  debt reduction. Creditors
indicated that they would be willing to consider restructuring  of the remaining  stock of
pre cut-off debt after three to four years.  Twelve countries have so far benefitted from
these new terms, and the consolidated  amount is about $2.5 billion.
In 1989, the US Secretary  of the Treasury called on the IMF and the World Bank
to  support and  encourage efforts  aimed at  commercial debt  reduction for  major
developing  countries by catalyzing  new financing.  Suibsequently,  the World Bank and
the IMF agreed that for the next three years a  proportion of  their lending may be
earmarked for debt reduction.  Among SSA countries, The Brady Plan has benefitted
only Nigeria.
Imnpact of Debt Relief  Measures
The Enhanced Toronto Terms are a step forward but they fall short of the terms
proposed  by John Major at Trinidad. Under  the "Trinidad  Terms" two thirds of the debt
stock  would be canceled followed  by a period of interest capitalization  to provide further
cash flow relief  and possibly  graduating  later payments,  depending  on the debtor's ability
to pay.  An assessment  of the impact of alternative rescheduling  terms can be made by
measuring  the reduction in the present  value of debt service  obligations  they  are expected
to produce.  This measure captures not only outright debt forgiveness  but also the larger
degree of concessionality  of rescheduled  debt resulting  from lower interest  charges. The
impact is  expressed by  the  ratio of  the present value of  debt to  exports.  When
simulations  were made to assess the impact  of alternative  terms on the severely indebted
low income countries it was found that even after the application  of Trinidad terms and
assuming the forgiveness of all bilateral concessional ODA loans, the debt to export
ratios remain unsustainable  for some of these countries  such as Mozambique,  Sudan  and
Somalia.3'  This suggests that the restoration of external viability may require even
further measures  by official and commercial  creditors.
Another evaluation  of the alternative debt rescheduling  proposals - The Toronto
terms, The Trinidad Terms and the Dutch proposal (full forgiveness  of bilateral  official
37/  World Debt Tables 1992-93 (World Bank 1992)- 28 -
debt owed by the least-developed  and other low-income  countries which  face severe debt
problems  and are implementing  sound economic policies) - was carried out by Abbate
and Tran-Nguyen.2'  This  study concluded that for the sample of 26  low income
countries, assuming a 5 percent annual growth rate of exports, the debt relief under the
Dutch  proposal was, on average, most favorable  although  for a few individual  countries  -
Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Somalia, Sao  Tome, etc.  - additional debt  service
reduction beyond the terms of the Dutch proposal would be required.  The important
difference  between the Dutch proposal  and the Trinidad terms lies in the inclusion  of the
post-cut off debt in the former.
All of the debt rescheduling  initiatives are designed principally to benefit only
low-income African countries; there are no comparable special programs for middle-
income African countries with acute  debt problems. Yet the middle-income  countries in
Africa face long-term development  problems not significantly  different from the low-
income countries. And, indeed, when the correction  of overvalued  currencies  - Nigeria's
for example - places some of these countries in the low-income  category, they should be
considered eligible for the same debt relief measures  as those granted to low-income
African countries.
There are a number  of technical  and legal problems  to be resolved  in determining
the adequacy  of debt relief measures.  Each debtor country has its specific  debt profile
and special circumstances, and the solution to its debt problem must be decided on a
case-by-case  basis.  As a general principle,  debt relief should  be given only to countries
that are both deb; distressed and willing to adopt reforms to improve their capacity for
growth and future debt service.  To truly benefit debtor countries, special finance for
debt relief or concessional  debt rescheduling  should be genuinely "additional"  and not
taken out of the aid budgets  already allocated to the beneficiary  countries.  In countries
with severe problems of arrears, bridge financing may be  needed to make use of debt
relief facilities.
African's debt, although a burden for the region, are only a small part of the
global portfolio  of creditors.  Significant  debt relief from new money  cannot be counted
on in the near future, and conventional  debt restructuring  is unlikely  to generate the debt
relief required to restore growth.  For most African countries the predominant  problem
is the official debt and although the Enhanced Toronto terms are a step in the right
direction, clearly more far-reaching  relief is needed.
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Debt Swa&
A large number of proposals have been made to relieve the pressure on foreign
exchange resources  by swapping local assets - physical or financial - for debts.  Nigeria
has already used Debt Swaps to reduce some of its external debt burden.  But in other
countries this has neither been widespread nor highly successful.
Debt  swaps  vary  greatly,  but  there  are  some  common features.  Most
arrangements enable the debtor to share part of the discount on debt, determine the
sectors of the economy in which equity can be purchased, and place restrictions  on the
dividends  and principal that it can be repatriated. The simplest form of swap - debt for
equity - has very  limited application in  Africa because of  the  lack of  perceived
investment  opportunities  and developed  markets for financial instruments.
Although debt-for-nature  swaps have received a lot of publicity in recent years,
the total amount converted through this mechanism  has remained small.  In SSA, only
Madagascar, Zambia, Nigeria and Ghana were able to convert about $6 to $7 million  of
face value.  Some initiatives  in debt-for-nature  swaps have been prepared  by the official
sector.  The new Paris Club terms for lower-middle  income countries, granted since
September 1990, have authorized the provision for various types of debt conversions,
such as debt-for-nature,  debt-for-aid,  debt-for-equity  and other local currency  debt swaps.
Provisions for voluntary bilateral swap arrangements  have been inserted into the Paris
Club agreements,  stipulating  that ODA and inter-governmental  loans  are eligible for such
debt conversions  without  limit and that export credits are eligible up to 10 percent of the
debt stock.  This clause has been inserted in the rescheduling  agreements  of the Congo
and Nigeria.
Similar to debt-fcr-nature swaps Debt-for-Development  swaps converted funds
support  projects in education,  health  and agriculture. UNICEF  has converted  $20 million
of the face value for its development  projects in Sudan.
Another  variation is for a donor to purchase debt (at a discount)  and then to pass
the loans to an NGO, on the understanding  that the debtor government will redeem the
loans  in local currency or bonds. The NGO will subsequently  exchange  or swap  the debt
and then use it for development  purposes.  Such local currency swaps are useful only
when the country has domestic savings available for that purpose; otherwise they may
result in inflationary pressures.  In the CFA Franc Zone, the scope for such swaps is
particularly  limited  because  of the convertibility  of local currency with the French Franc.
For a debtor country to benefit, such programs must provide  additionality  otherwise  the
net resource flow impact will remain zero.- 30 -
Prose5cts
The momentum  of aid generated  in the past few yeaxs  will have to be maintained
during the  1990s for several reasons.  The World Bank's LTPS study estimated the
external capital requirements for financing  SSA's development  needs that will translate
into one percent average growth per year in per capita consumption  for the region in the
1990s.  As the  first  two years of  the  1990s have seen  a  decline in  per  capita
consumption,  the updated requirements  of external  financing  amount  to $30 billion (1990
prices) of gross requirements annually consisting  of debt relief of $12 billion and new
money flows of $18 billion. Donors will have to consider a number of developments  in
setting aid policy in  the  1990s.  First,  countries will have to continue the difficult
economic  reform programs initiated in recent years.  Those that have not yet embarked
on reform will need to do so.  Unless  these programs are funded adequately,  they cannot
be effective  or sustained.
Second, there are some major new entrants to the list of IDA-eligible  countries.
Nigeria has already become  eligible  and will increasingly  depend  on official  development
assistance to  meet its external resource gap.  In  the past Nigeria, has received a
negligible  amount of ODA ($0.6 per capita in 1986).  If by the year 2000 it were tc
receive the same level of per capita ODA as other oil-exporting  African countries such
as Cameroon, it will account for about $2.5 billion of ODA a year; this would mean.  a
17 percent increase in ODA.  In addition,  Angola can be expected to join IDA.
Third, special efforts are needed in the 1990s to correct the backsliding  that has
occurred  in areas such as food security, human  resource development,  and infrastructure
and to fund initiatives in family planning and the environment. For  human resource
development,  additional expenditures  of about $10 billion (1990 prices) a year will be
needed by 2000.  The backlog of road maintenance  itself is estimated to cost $5 billion
on top of the $700 million needed annually during the next decade to avoid further
deterioration.  Large initial efforts are needed  to give momentum  to programs for family
planning  and environmental  protection.
The World Bank estimates that a net transfer of resources of about 9 percent of
GDP on average will be required to achieve sustained  growth during the 1990s. The
ODA required to  meet these targets will depend on  such variables as  debt relief
programs, non-concessional  capital inflows from private and public sources, and reserve
requirements  - all of which are subject to uncertainties. With sustained  policy reforms,
private capital inflows  could improve significantly  through  increased  private remittances,
reverse capital flight and improved  inflows  of foreign  private investment. Evidence  from
several countries (such as Ghana and Senegal),  however, suggests that restoring private
sector confidence takes time and that during the next decade only moderate  progress can
be  expected.  Moreover,  given  deteriorating credit-worthiness, non-concessional
borrowing should be lower than in the past.  It is estimated that the net receipts from
these sources will be moderate, probably about $6 billion a year.- 31 -
The external resource requirement  of Sub-Saharan  Africa during the 1990s  could
be met if donors achieve  two related targets. First, gross ODA must continue  to increase
during the 1990s  at about 4 percent a year in real terms. Second, debt relief mechanisms
put in place so that the actual debt service payments for countries with strong reform
programs are kept within manageable limits ( a  menu of  options for debt relief is
discussed in the following section).  For the region as a  whole it is estimated that
adequate debt relief will be available to keep the debt service payments in the  1990s
around the level of the 1980s (that is, about $9 billion a year).  If this does not occur,
higher levels of external assistance will be necessary.  Alternatively, if debt relief
exceeds the above estimate, external assistance requirements  would be correspondingly
reduced.
A more permanent solution to SSA's external debt problem will be one of the
most important  development  challenges of the 1990s. Without a return to a reasonable
degree of external viability - the ability to service external claims without recourse to
rescheduling  and arrears - the necessary adjustment, investment  and modest growth in
per capita incomes that Africa requires to recover and get on the path to sustainable
development  will remain elusive.
The scope for the expansion  of other alternative sources of external capital for
SSA such as commercial  bank lending, FDI and the return of flight capital is limited.
The only viable option is for a continued flow of ODA.
However, SSA must help itself by raising its domestic savings rate.  Foreign
resources need to become less of a substitute for, and more a complement  to, domestic
savings. The region, SSA with the help of donors, must also use its external resources
more efficiently. Finally, the quality  and efficiency  of overall domestic  investment  needs
to be improved.  It is to these issues which we now turn.- 32 -
INVESTMENT
The ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP in SSA has not recovered from
its historical  levels of 23 percent in the 1970s. Investment  has remained  depressed even
in countries  which have intensively  adjusted their economies.  Although  there was a slight
recovery in the period 1986-90, the overall ratio of  16 percent to 17 percent is much
lower than the 25 percent average for developing  countries  as a group (Table VII). The
gross national savings rate in SSA of less than 10 percent is also in stark contrast to the
24 percent achieved by the developing  countries  as a group.  It is often thought  that poor
countries with a low level of per capita incomes  cannot save very much.  The evidence
from South Asia, a region with almost identical  per capita incomes as SSA, contradicts
this belief. The differential  in the savings rate between the two regions in the 1970s  was
insignificant,  but between 1986  and 1990  the average  national savings  rate in South Asia
was almost 20 percent, about twice as high as in SSA.  The collapse  of saving in SSA
is partly responsible for the region's low investment ratios.  However, the doubling of
external resource flows during the same period should have enhanced investment.
The average ratio of total investment  to GDP in SSA masks the variance among
countries  in the region, ranging  from 2 percent to 50 percent. It is noteworthy,  however,
that during 1986-90  the nine countries with the highest  per capita incomes in the region
had lower investment  ratios than the region's nine lowest income countries. This reflects
the fact that decline in  investment seemed to continue for the comparatively  higher
income group during adjustment, while there has been some recovery of investment
among  the comparatively  lower income  group, providing  some  optimism  for an improved
outlook for investment  growth.
Private Investment
Private investment  in SSA has remained  stable  around 10 percent  during the 1980s
and is relatively  concentrated  in the higher income countries of the region.  A  iav
of determinants of private investment will help us understand why levels of private
investment remain depressed.  A survey of the literature reveals that several factors
influence  private investment.
A certain amount of  macroeconomic  stability -- such as low and predictable
inflation, external and internal balance -- are of paramount importance to ensuring a
strong response of private investment  to economic  incentives. The recent literature has
emphasized  the key role of uncertainty  in investment  decisions  because the uncertainty
follows directly from the irreversible nature of investment expenditures.  Empirical
studies have also found that fiscal deficits and foreign  debt have a strong negative effect
on private investment.- 33 -
An overvalued  exchange rate can also be a factor, because it reduces the returns
in local currency received by exporting farmers and manufacturers. Real interest rates
and policies affecting them can influence private investment, but there is no empirical
finding supporting this relation for developing  countries.  This is because of repressed
financial markets in these countries, where credit policy (and not interest rates) directly
affects the investment level.  The impact of public investment on private investment
depends on whether they are complementary  or substitutes. The most important effect
that the public sector has on private investment in developing countries is through
institutions and regulations.  Investors, local and foreign, are frequently hampered by
legal and bureaucratic impediments,  as well as by underdeveloped  capital markets.
A case study 39'  of Zimbabwe  confirms the importance  of government policies
in stimulating  private investment  and concludes that one of the key issues to be tackled
by public policy should  be to raise expected  future profits by reducing  the perceived risk
of investment.  In most African countries, the perceived risks are fairly high and the
response of potential investors can be positive only if these risks are  minimized or
shared.
A study of  sixteen SSA countries was carried out for the period 1980-90 to
examine how adjustment has affected private investment in Africa.  LI' The findings  of
this study suggest  that determinants  of private investment  in SSA countries  do not follow
the same pattern as in other regions.  In Africa, real effective  exchange rates are found
to significantly  affect private investment  - a finding  not borne out by the studies of other
regions and developing countries as a  group.  This outcome is consistent with an
interpretation that a real depreciation of local currency expands exports, raises real
incomes,  and consequently  stimulates  aggregate  investment  expenditures. The study also
shows that long-term debt in SSA does not have any statistically  significant effect on
private investment  in  the region.  As is true for other developing  countries,real interest
rates also do not have any significant effect on private investment.  Inflation has a
positive effect on private investment  but the effect is statistically  insignificant.
Why is private investment  not responding  to the policy changes taking place in
adjusting countries?  Prior to adjustment, the pattern of  investment in  Africa was
oriented  towards import substituting  industries  under high protective  barriers.  A reduction
in protection and exposure to competition from imports has squeezed the profits and
lowered sales in these industries.  Significant  devaluation  makes imported inputs more
expensive,while higher interest rates erode opportunities for cheap local borrowing,
which had encouraged foreign investors. Higher prices for energy,transport and other
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services have the same adverse effect on current and expected profit flows.  Thus the
immediate response of  the investors to policy changes is how best to  manage these
disruptions.
The immediate  effect of adjustment  policies  on investment  has called into question
the credibility  and sustainability  of these policies in some countries. The World Bank's
third review of adjustment  lending (RAL III) 4'  completed in 1992,  a ' 'esses  this issue
more systematically. Its major findings  can be summed up as follows:
(1)  The response of private investment to adjustment programs has taken
longer than initially  anticipated. However, private investment  has begun
to  recover  in  some  adjusting  countries,  especially  middle-income
countries.
(2)  In fact, the pattern of investment response to an adjustment program
seems  to  have two  phases.  In  the  first  phase,  there  is  an  initial
contraction  and then stagnation  of the share of private investment  in GDP.
This is the phase of "investment  pause" caused by necessary  stabilization
measures.  Reducing aggregate demand through fiscal and  monetary
contraction  reduces the demand for output and thus the readiness  of firms
to invest.  Phase two is the sustained increase in the share of private
investment in  GDP.  Once distortions are  removed and stabilization
attained, the  private  investment ratio  begins  to  rise  in  response to
economic  incentives  that lead to export expansion  and output growth.
(3)  Although some sort of "investment  pause" in response to adjustment is
most common, the  length and intensity of  the  pause differs among
countries. The difference is due to the fluctuating  intensity in adjustrient
efforts, varied initial conditions  from which adjustment  programs started,
and a changed business  environment.  In most middle-income  countries,
the investment  pause (phase I) lasted 3-5 years.  In low income adjusting
countries, export and  output growth have been weaker, and  private
investment has not yet recovered.
(4)  Efficiency of investment  allocation improved after adjustment programs
even during the period of the "investment  pause".  Adjustment  programs
generally  succeeded  in bringing  prices more into line with economic  costs,
and  exposure to  increased international competition also  resulted in
stronger cost discipline, greater technological  capability, and increased
productivity. These gains in efficiency  from adjustment  programs helped
to generate greater output growth from existing levels of investment.
41/  World Bank. The Third Report on Adiustment Lendine: Private and Public Resources for Growth
Washington D.C.,  March 1992.- 35 -
(5)  The  varying nature of  investment response to  adjustment programs
depends  on economic  predictability,  the legal and regulatory framework,
physical infrastructure, and the functioning  of factor markets.  Investor
confidence  about the stability of the macroeconomic  environment  and the
permanence  of structural reforms seems most crucial. Strong investment
recoveries in  middle income countries after  a  pause is  explained by
sustained  adjustment  efforts and measures  that have improved  the business
environment, including good regulatory and financial policies, adequate
and  well  maintained infrastructure, efficient factor  markets and  a
supportive legal and administrative  framework.  A lack or weakness of
these conditions explains the poor  investment response to  adjustment
programs in developing  countries.
(6)  Adjustment  programs have generally succeeded  in reducing  distortionary
trade and financial and exchange rate policies, but  have had limited
success,  especially  in low-income  SSA countries,  in encouraging  measures
needed to improve the business environment. Where implementation  of
adjustment  programs has been tentative, economic uncertainty  has played
a major role in causing private investors to defer investment decisions.
Even a  er adjustment programs started, continuing  barriers to the entry
and exist of firms and uncertainty regarding the legal and regulatory
framework  for private investment  continues  to constrain  private investors
in many SSA countries.
To sum up, adjustment programs in the short-run may have a negative  effect on
private investment because of reduction in aggregate demand and contractionary fiscal
and  monetary policies.  However, as  structural reforms are  carried  out,  private
investment  can be expected  to recover in response  to a new set of incentives. However,
this later recovery and growth of private investment would depend on a  congenial
business environment.
Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been a dynamic and growing source of
capital flows to developing  countries in the last five years.  FDI net flows to developing
countries increased  from $ 500 million in 1965  to slightly  over $ 10 billion in 1985, and
then more than tripled to almost $ 34 billion in 1991. Until the mid-1970s, the level at
FDI in SSA was similar to that of other developing regions.In the 1980s there was a
marked decline and FDI now plays a small role in overall investment  and total external
resource flows.  In the last sixteen years, the share of African countries in total FDI
flows to developing  countries has remained  stagnant at $ 1.3 billion. Nigeria is the only
country which has attracted large sums of FDI mainly for its oil and gas sectors.- 36 -
As noted earlier, policy makers  and others in Africa have a skeptical  view of the
benefits that can accrue to national economies from FDI.  The conventional  view has
been that multi-national  corporations invest in Africa primarily to exploit the natural
resource wealth of African countries in order to maximize monopoly  rents.  Evidence
from other developing  countries  suggest  that these fears are not well-founded.  FDI shou!d
become  an attractive source of capital flows for SSA also.  The two major obstacles  in
the short run to higher growth in this region are low investment  and shortages  of foreign
exchange. Foreign direct investment  could address both problems.  It brings in foreign
exchange,supplemrrents  domestic  savings  and raises investment. Foreign investment  could
also increase efficiency  of the domestic  economy.
FDI also offers a number of advantages  over commercial borrowing, 4'  which
has proven costly to African  countries in terms of the debt crisis.  First, equity financing
requires  payments  only when the investment  earns a profit, while debt requires  payments
irrespective  of country's economic  and balance  of payments  situation.  Second, payments
on FDI can be regulated  by the host country  while debt repayments  are outside  its control
(affected, as they are, by interest rates set in the international  market).  Third, because
much of FDI consists of reinvested  earnings,only  a portion of the returns on investment
typically  is repatriated. Debt, on the other hand, requires full repayment  of interest and
principal on loans.  The reinvestment  also involves less constraints and has an almost
built-in rollover  mechanism compared with  the  fluctuations in  commercial bank
lending.Fourth, FDI permits a  closer match between the maturity structures ot  the
earnings from an investment and that of the required payments to the capital used to
finance it,thus avoiding the mismatch  created when developing countries borrow short
term to finance long term investments. FDI also offers externalities, which borrowing
does not. FDI flows help in easing capital shortages  and financing  balance of payments
but its long-term  benefit lies more in the transfer of technology,  human  capital creation,
the development of  managerial skills and foreign market penetration. SSA has to
diversify its limited production and export base and these attributes of FDI can play a
vital role in this process.
Recently  questions  have  been raised about whether  investment  can be attracted  on
the basis  of  advantages such as  cheap labor.  A  recent survey 43,  for  example,
concluded  that the ability of countries  to attract investment  in manufacturing  on the basis
of the availability  of cheap, unskilled  labor has diminished  in recent years. The need for
such labor in the manufacture  of many  products simply  is much  less than it was a decade
ago,  and  this  trend  will surely continue.  Given the  current  pace of  technology
development in  products and  processes, even  most export platforms will require
techn,ological  (including  human)  upgrading  'o remain competitive. Developing  countries
42/  Michalopoulos, C.  'Private  Direct Investment, Finance and Development,"Asian Develooment
Review, Volume 3, No. 2,  1985.
43/  'Iiller, Robert. 1993. 'Determinants of U.S. Manufacturing Investment Abroad."  Finance and
Development  .- 37 -
that have more highly skilled labor available  at relatively  low wages  can more favorably
influence  plant location  decisions. Nevertheless,  some  types  of products (apparel, shoes)
thus far have remained largely unaffected by the declining dependence on labor in
manufacturing. For investors in these industries, there will continue to be a motivation
for locating production in poorer countries.
It  is unlikely that most African countries can compete favorably with other
developing  regions in the production  of unsophisticated  goods, but there are at least seven
or eight countries  which have relatively  better prospects than most developing  countries.
Many of them are in the process of transition from a highly controlled and command
economy to  creating a  more liberal policy and  hisiness environment.  Currently,
investment  in these countries  does not yet appear  attrzctive. However, as the IFC notes:
"The reform programs often make the business environment  more difficult in the short
to medium term by introducing the need to adapt to more competitive  circumstances.
Furthermore, measures aimed at reducing deficits often result in  restrained overall
demand and depressed local markets. Many businesses  find it difficult to adjust to trade
reforms and industrial restructuring measures  and to absorb increased input and debt
service costs caused by local currency devaluations.  In  this kind of environment,
investors adopt a wait and see attitude before making new investments  or expanding
operations. In the long term. however, the success of such reforms should increase the
scope for private sector activity." "'
"There have been important  changes  in capital movements  at a global level -- the
growing integration  of capital markets across borders, institutions  and financial  markets.
Traditional  markets have matured. Businesses  have become  international  in perspective,
looking  beyond their national  borders for new products, customers  and inputs. Improved
transport and communications  have facilitated this as  has technological change and
innovation.
Such changes  suggest  that  long-term  external structural  reasons  exist for continued
flows of capital to developing  countries. Much depends  on better economic  management
and greater political  stability  in SSA. In a global  market place there is a sharply-reduced
tolerance for poor policies."
Prgpcsff
Africa faces  a real dilemma.To  meet its requirements  of external  capital  a number
of low middle income African countries will have to rely increasingly  on FDI as other
types of traditional  flows such as ODA,comrnmercial  bank lending, and non concessional
official finance become relatively scarce.On the other hand, the image  of Africa among
prospective investors is not very favorable at present and the perceived political and
economic risks are  high. Growing competition for foreign investment from Eastern
44/  IFC.  1989.  Annual Report 1989.- 38 -
Europe  and the republics  of the FSU has further limited  opportunities  for Africa. Thus,
even if African  countries succeed in implementing  the reforms and changes necessary  it
is not obvious that it will succeed in attracting substantial  new FDI. The expectation  for
FDI should, then remain modest  and realistic. It would  be unwise  to pin too much hope
on foreign investment flows to bridge either the foreign exchange or domestic savings
gaps.
This  does  not  imply  that  African governments should  not  resolve  their
ambivalence  about the role of FDI in their countries and strive to create an enabling
environment  which is conducive  to foreign  investment.  The difficulties  faced by existing
investors in Africa have not diminished  and an active effort to attract FDI to the region
has not yet been made.  Foreign investors already engaged in business in  African
countries should  be  encouraged to  stay  and  expand.  This  can  have a  positive
demonstration  effect for potential  new investors. Companies  can also be actively  offered
specific investment proposals, briefed about economic and political conditions and
provided the requisite information  needed  to make  decisions. Foreign  investors can also
be exposed to business opportunities  with offers of management  contracts, plant and
technology licensing agreements, production sharing agreements, and  international
subcontracting.  In the end, the results will depend  on the successful  implementation  and
liberalization of  domestic and  foreign trade  regimes in  African countries and  an
improvement  in the  perceived political  and economic  risks of doing business.- 39 -
CONCLUSIONS
Our survey of the prospects for trade, aid and investment  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
leads to the following  broad conclusions:
(a)  The relative pay-off from orienting outward, improving competitiveness
and recapturing lost share in  world markets is  higher than any other
strategy for growth and sustainable  development  in SSA countries.  Had
SSA maintained  internal competitiveness  and retained its 1970 share in
world exports, successfully defending against 'new'  entrants, its 1990
level of exports would have been at least $50 billion higher than actual
earnings.  This  calculation assumes that the composition of  African
exports would have changed in consonance with the growth in world
trade.  Had SSA continued to rely on primary commodity  exports alone,
the relative gains would have been much smaller. Care should be taken,
however, not to allocate resources for further expansion  in commodities
and minerals in which the relative share of SSA exceeds price elasticity
of world demand.
(b'  Although the  dependence of  SSA  on  external  resource  flows  for
investment, imports and development has increased in the last decade,
budgetary constraints in the OECD countries, competing demand from
new claimants and the insistence on  new types of  conditionalities  by
bilateral donors such as democratization,  reduced military spending, and
improvement  of human rights will make it difficult to sustain a high level
of aid.  Almost all African countries will have to  mobilize domestic
resources and increase domestic saving rates by reducing public sector
dissavings,  financial  losses of public enterprises  and other non-productive
expenditures. While a group of low middle income African countries is
capable of attracting a significant amount of  foreign direct investment
most resource poor countries, especially  in the Sahel and Horn of Africa,
will continue to be dependent  on foreign aid.
(c)  There is a consensus on economic  grounds, for finding a more durable
solution to Africa's debt problem. The fact that only one-half of the debt
service due can be paid suggests the urgent need to reduce the stock of
debt and thus debt servicing  obligations  in alignment with debt servicing
capacity.  Many of  the current proposals, if  implemented, can bring
considerable  relief.
(d)  Productive investment levels in most African countries have remained
depressed,  and  even  where  economic  policy  reforms  have  been- 40 -
implemented, the investor response - both domestic and foreign - has been
poor.  Uncertainty, lack of credibility and continuity, fears of policy
reversals, thc  ontagion  effect of Africa, and more attractive  opportunities
elsewhere, reinforce structural weaknesses  such as poor infrastructure, a
weak human resource base and inefficient  services to deny Africa of new
investment. Nevertheless,  there are several countries, which can succeed
in attracting significant  amounts of investment because of their domestic
market size, location in the region, low labor costs and natural resource
endowments.
(e)  More fundamentally, the  impetus of  Africa's  growth and sustainable
development will  come  only  by  investing in  and  accelerating the
education, training and skill development and capacities of  its human
resources and  by  improving the  means of  linking these  skills and





Value  of  1xpo  1938  36.9
Value of Exports (S billion)  3.6  7.6  48.9  27.8  36.2
'Value  of Imports (S billion)  3.8  7.2  42.8  27.2  36.9
Volume Index of Exports (1980= 100)  52  99  100  77  92
Volume Index of Imports (1980= 100)  36  54  100  69  75
Unit Value Index of Exports ('980=  100)  14  15  100  66  80
Unit Value Index of Imports (1980= 100)  22  25  100  92  116
Terms of Trade Index (1980= 100)  55  54  100  72  69
Purchasing Power Index of Exports (1980= 100)  30  56  100  57  63
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook  of Investment  Trade and
Development  Statistics, 1991.TABLE 11
Shares of Sub-Saharan  African Exports
(Percentage  Shares)
12Q  980  12X  990
A.  World Exports  2.5  2.5  1.2  1.0
B.  Developing  Country
Exports  13.2  8.5  6.1  4.9
C.  Primary Commodity
Exports  6.2  4.5"  3.9  4.0
D.  Non-oil Primary
Exports  7.3  3.91/  4.1  2.7
E.  Agricultural  Raw
Material Exports  4.9  3.4"  3.0  2.8
F.  Minerals, Ores and
Metal Exports  10.2  5.61"  4.7  3.7
Sources:  1)  UNCTAD, Handbook  of International
and Development  Statistics, 1991.
2)  UNCTAD, Commodity  Yearbook, 1992.
1/ Pertains to 1981TABLE  In
Shae  of Maior African  Commodity Expo-ts in World Exports
Average  Average  Pgcentaae Change between
197  First and Secon  Periods
Cocoa  74.2  65.2  -12.1
Copper  44.7  42.4  -5.1
Coffee  30.3  23.5  -22.1
Cotton  18.4  15.0  -18.S
Tea  17.5  19.6  12.0
Tobacco  9.6  12.3  28.1
Sugar  6.1  5.2  -14.8
Source: UNCTAD, Commodity  Yearbook (Various Issues)TABLE lY
Aggregate Net Flows and Net Transfers to Sub-Saharan  Africa
(USS million)
A.  Net Flows on Long Term Debt  824  7,940  5,399  4,974
B.  Official Grants  363  3,089  4,880  11,669
C.  Foreign Direct Investment  92  20  719  669
D.  IMF Purchases (net)  -44  833  -482  -34
Aggregate Net Flows (ANF) (A+B+C+D)  25  11.881  10Q516  17.278
E.  Interest on Long Term Debt  180  2,277  3,391  4,255
F.  Profits on FDI  737  2,890  1,339  1,313
ALLregate  Net Transfers (ANT) (ANF-E-F)  6,S711.669
Memo Items:
Aggregate Net Flows (Constant 1992  S)  - 14.7  1367  18.035
Aggregate Net Transfers (Constant 1992  S)  - 8  12,180
ource: '  orld Debt Tables 1992-93TABLE Y
Structure  of 12ebt  Stock
(end 1991)
(S billion)
Sub-Saharan  Afric  S P A C
Amoun  Shau  Aoin  shar
A.  OFFICIAL  LQ  4  1
Muitilateral  40  22.5  22  37.5
Concessional  26  14.6  19  32.2
Non-Concessional  14  7.9  3  5.1
Bilateral  70  39.3  23  39.0
Concessional  34  19.1  16  27.1
Non-Concessional  36  20.2  7  7.8
B.  PRIVATE  39  2L2  U  Li
Commercial  Banks  21  11.8  2  3.4
Other Private  18  10.1  5.1
C.  SHORT-TERM  DEBT  21  4  _  7
D.  IMF  7
Total
Memo item:
Concessional Debt - 1980  26.9  39.1
1991  33.8  60.0
Source: World Debt Tables 1992-93.TABLE  VI
Structure of Debt Servicinf Actually Paid
(end 1991)
(S billion)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  S  Countries
AmQu  n  Share  Am  X Share
Multilateral  32  7  S  Li  6 
Wodld  Bank  2.0  19.4  0.8  25.0
IMF  0.8  7.8  0.5  15.6
Bilateral  Official  nI  1
Commercial  Banks  2O  2.11
Other Private  LZ  ,g  QL  2A
Short-term  Debt  . ^  .i
Total  10.3  100.0  3.2  100.0
=  =  =  ,= =  -=  =
Memo items:
Net transfers from"
the World Bank  0.5  0.9
Aggregate  net transfers  11.4  7.7
Source: World Debt Tables 1992-93.
1/  Not rurnfe,  in 1991 wem lower than the averge  becauw of the large paymayt of acwuilatod  ani
by Zambia.  The not tnarfer  fmrm the World Banrk  in 1988-90 period  to SSA and SPA we  S.  I bilLion
and $l.0  billion  pectively.T&UBLEVU
Sub-Saharan  Afric
Key Savings and Investment  Indicators
(Percent of GDP)
1970*89  1991-95  1996-9
Gross Investment  Ratio  20.8  15.7  16.8
Private Investment  Ratio  - 10.4  10.2
Foreign Direct Investmt. Ratio  - 0.7  0.8
Gross National Savings Ratio  14.6  9.3  9.7
Mdemo  Items:
Gross Investment  Ratio for
Developing  Countries  24.7  24.1  25.3
Gross National Savings Ratio for  22.2  22.1  24.0
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